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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, I study an asset
pricing implication of a New Keynesian model. Quantitative New Keynesian
models have strong implications for the joint variation of total wealth, nominal
bond yields, and real bond yields. I use stock market betas of nominal and
real bonds as summaries of this joint variation, and ask whether model-implied
betas can be parameterized to be consistent with observed betas. Using UK
data, I document that the observed beta of a ten-year nominal bond dropped
to zero when the UK government gave operational independence to the Bank
of England. The observed beta of a ten-year inflation-indexed bond is close to
zero both before and after independence. I show that a broad range of plausible
model parameterizations cannot reproduce any of these observed betas.
In Chapter 2, I study the effects of positive trend inflation on the term
structure of interest rates. I examine the effects on a number of aspects of
the yield curve: the steady state, the mean, the variance, impulse responses
to economic shocks, and risk compensation. I find that higher rate of trend
inflation leads to more volatile inflation, which in turn increases the volatility
of bond prices and the quantity of risk compensation. The quantitative effects
of these findings are quite small when we assume the standard log utility of the
representative household. However, the quantitative effects become significant
when we assume the household with Epstein-Zin preferences. For example, the
average slope of the yield curve is 1.02 percent for 2 percent inflation, while it
is 1.35 percent for 6 percent trend inflation. Excess returns to 10-year bond
are 5.6 percent for 2 percent trend inflation and 6.7 percent for 6 percent trend
ii
inflation.
In Chapter 3, I study the welfare effects of financial globalization. Debt and
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows account for the vast majority of foreign
capital going into developing countries. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) study
the welfare consequences from liberalizing debt flows using the Ramsey growth
model and find that the welfare gains is quite limited. This paper studies the
welfare gains from liberalizing FDI flows and find much larger gains (four per-
cent increase in permanent consumption in the baseline specifications). The key
assumption is that FDI flows bring a superior technology into host countries.
Additional gains from liberalizing debt flows besides FDI flows are limited. This
paper conducts a number of sensitivity analysis. For example, it examines the
consequences of a decrease in the world real interest rate, the phenomena ob-
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Chapter 1
Evaluating a New Keynesian
Model Using Stock Market
Betas of Bond Returns
1.1 Introduction
New Keynesian models have strong implications for the joint variation of total
wealth, nominal bond yields, and real bond yields. For example, in a simple
New Keynesian model, a positive technology shock lowers nominal and real bond
yields, whereas it increases total wealth.1 The joint variation of bond yields and
total wealth translate into a certain relationship of bond returns and return on
total wealth, which can be summarized by stock market betas of nominal and
real bonds.2
In this paper, I point out that the bond-equity return relationship in data
is still puzzling from the perspective of a New Keynesian model, which can
account for the average slope of the nominal yield curve, as well as several other
aspects of the term structure. More specifically, using the time-varying stock
1See, for example, the model presented in Chapter 3 of Gaĺı (2008).
2Here I use the equity return as an approximation of total wealth.
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market betas of long-term nominal and real UK government bonds as measures
of the bond-equity return relationship, I find that the model fails to replicate
the levels of both the nominal and real bond betas, even considering a wide
range of parameters.3 I include real bonds in the analysis because it allows us
to break down shocks to nominal bonds into shocks that are specific to nominal
bonds (primarily inflation shocks) and other shocks.4
Figure 1.1 shows quarterly estimated stock market betas of 10-year nominal
and real UK government bonds. I choose to use UK data because they offer the
longest sample period for real bonds among advanced economies. The vertical
line in the figure indicates the point at which the UK government announced
that it would grant operational independence to the Bank of England (May 6,
1997).
I highlight three features about the bond-equity return relationship that can
be seen in Figure 1.1. First, the nominal bond beta falls sharply from about 0.4
to zero around the time of the announcement of operational independence. To
emphasize, the positive return relationship between the 10-year nominal bond
and the equity disappeared following the announcement. Second, the real bond
beta also showed a similar change, although, statistically speaking, the beta was
zero during most of the sample period. That is, the long-term real bond return
and the equity return scarcely moved together in the sample. Third, both the
nominal and real bond betas were equal (and zero) after the announcement,
meaning that the two types of government bonds are essentially the same in
3Although this is the same beta that shows up in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), this paper is not tied to the CAPM.
4Formally the real bond is called indexed-linked gilts in UK. For simplicity, I call it the
real bond in this paper.
2
terms of their relationship to the equity, although the two bond prices are not
perfectly correlated (i.e., they do not move in lockstep). This suggests that
shocks that are specific to nominal bonds (inflation shocks) still exist but are
idiosyncratic and that they do not show up in equity returns after independence.
The figure suggests that changes in UK monetary policy brought about by
the independence of the Bank of England may have led to changes in the nominal
and real bond betas. Adopting this interpretation, I examine whether a New
Keynesian model with Epstein-Zin recursive preferences can explain the features
about the bond-equity return relationship mentioned above, with some changes
in the monetary policy rule. More specifically, I interpret the announcement
about the Bank of England’s independence as an event that changed several
parameters associated with monetary policy in the model: the coefficients of
inflation-gap and output-gap in the monetary policy rule, as well as the level
of trend inflation, which largely determines the long-run inflation rate in the
model.
I use a New Keynesian model rather than a consumption-based asset pricing
model, so that I can explicitly discuss the link between monetary policy and
asset prices. I use a New Keynesian model with recursive preferences, since
models with recursive preferences have recently succeeded in explaining well-
known facts about the nominal yield curve, such as the average slope of the curve
(Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012; van Binsbergen
et al., 2012). These authors examine whether the model can explain univariate
features of the term structure, such as the average slope of the yield curve,
whereas I examine a bivariate feature (the bond-equity return relationship) of
the term structure.
3
The analysis leads to two main results that shed light on the aspects of the
bond-equity return relationship that the model fails to explain, as well as the
reasons for the model’s failure. First, model-implied betas of long-term real
bonds are close to one for a wide range of monetary policy parameters. The
reason is that equity in the model (modeled as a claim to aggregate output) is
similar to a real bond because output volatility is low. However, observed betas
of inflation-indexed bonds are close to zero.
Second, model-implied betas of long-term nominal bonds are greater than
those of real bonds and thus greater than one. The wedge between nominal
and real bonds is driven by inflation expectations. In typical New Keynesian
frameworks, shocks to output are negatively correlated with shocks to inflation,
hence the positive relationship between nominal bond prices and equity prices
exceeds that for real bond prices. However, prior to the UK announcement of
independence, observed betas of nominal bonds are substantially less than one.
Moreover, after the announcement, betas for both nominal and real bonds are
indistinguishable from each other (and equal to zero).
In principle, post-announcement betas of nominal and real bonds could
match if investors interpreted the announcement as the end of inflation in the
UK. Then nominal and real bonds would move in lockstep. However, returns to
nominal bonds are more volatile than returns to inflation-indexed bonds both
before and after the announcement. Thus in the data, the wedge between nom-
inal and real bonds is unrelated to equity returns. This property is inconsistent
with New Keynesian joint dynamics of inflation and output.
4
Related Literature This paper relates to three strands of literature. First,
the paper builds on the literature on dynamic general equilibrium modeling of
the term structure of interest rates. An early discussion in the literature is
that of Backus et al. (1989), who show that the standard consumption-based
asset pricing model generates a downward sloping yield curve, rather than the
upward-sloping curve seen in the data. den Haan (1995) finds that the standard
real business cycle model has the same implication.
Among a large number of the studies, this paper is particularly cognate
with Piazzesi and Schneider (2007), Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), and van
Binsbergen et al. (2012), all of whom use recursive preferences to attempt to
resolve the puzzle in slightly different settings. The key idea of these papers
is that investors with recursive preferences are afraid of shocks that move in-
flation and future consumption growth in opposite directions, because then the
nominal bond loses its value when investors particularly favor consumption.5
Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) empirically find, in the U.S. data, that positive
inflation surprises indeed tend to lead to lower future consumption growth,
whereas Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) find that technology shocks have the
same feature.
Second, this paper relates to the literature on the bond-equity return rela-
tionship. Baele et al. (2010) study the sources of the U.S. bond-equity return
relationship using a dynamic factor model. Observing that the CAPM beta
5These models still imply a downward-sloping real yield curve. The U.S. data suggest
an upward-sloping real yield curve, whereas UK data suggest a downward-sloping real yield
curve. Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) argue that the UK real yield curve is downward
sloping because of the special demand from pension funds and life insurance companies due
to regulations. Kısacıkoğlu (2013) examines the properties of the real term structure in a
variety of New Keynesian models.
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of 10-year nominal U.S. Treasury bonds switches signs over time, Campbell et
al. (2013a) build a dynamic term structure model that allows the bond-stock
covariance to change signs. Campbell et al. (2013b) examine the time-varying
U.S. bond-equity return relationship, using a New Keynesian model with habit
formation.
Third, this paper relates to the literature on positive trend inflation; i.e., a
positive inflation rate in the deterministic steady state, as opposed to zero, as
is normally assumed in the literature. Recent work on positive trend inflation
shows that it significantly affects the properties of the model: the steady state
(Ascari, 2004), the stochastic mean of macro variables in the model (Amano
et al., 2007), the determinacy of the model (Ascari and Ropele, 2009; Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2011), and the optimal monetary policy (Ascari and Ro-
pele, 2007). This paper contributes to the literature on positive trend inflation
by examining its effects on asset prices. Using a new Keynesian model with
recursive preferences, Goto (2013) examines in detail the relationship between
positive trend inflation and asset prices, as in this paper.
1.2 Stock Market Betas of UK Nominal and
Real Government Bonds
In this section, I present empirical findings about the stock market betas of UK
10-year nominal and real government bonds (henceforth, the nominal bond beta
and the real bond beta), which I later use to evaluate the model presented in
Section 1.3.
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Estimation I assume that both the nominal and real betas are constant
within a quarter but can vary over quarters.6 Under this assumption, we can
consistently estimate the betas by running the following regression for each
quarter:
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t
where Ri,t denotes the daily return on either the 10-year nominal or real bond in
excess of the return on the 1-year nominal bond.7 Rm,t denotes the excess return
on the UK aggregate stock market index (the FTSE all-share index). Lewellen
and Nagel (2006) take this approach to estimate the time-varying CAPM betas
of various portfolios.
The assumption that the beta is constant within a quarter seems reasonable.
The bulk of the research finds that expected returns vary over time but do so
over several years.8 Thus, if the beta varies monthly or weekly, expected returns
(βiRm,t) become much more volatile than previous research suggests.
To address a potential issue of nonsynchronous trading, I also estimate the
betas including a lead and a lagged market return in the regression, as in Dimson
(1979). This does not affect the results reported in this paper.
Data Before turning to the estimation results, I describe the bond and equity
data used in the estimation. The data sample is 1986Q1 through 2010Q4.
I use the FTSE all-share index to construct the market return. The FTSE
6I obtain qualitatively the same results, even if I assume the betas are constant within
a month. The results are statistically less precise, since there are only 22 trading days per
month on average.
7In the Appendix, I describe in detail how I construct the nominal return series for the
real bond.
8See, for example, a review article by Cochrane (2008).
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all-share index is a market capitalization-weighted index representing the per-
formance of all eligible companies listed on the London Stock Exchange’s main
market. The index covers approximately 98 percent of the UK’s market capi-
talization. These data come from Bloomberg.
The UK government bond yield data come from the Bank of England. The
Bank of England estimates nominal and real yield curves on a daily basis. An-
derson and Sleath (2001) present the estimation procedure for the yield curves.
I construct the return series of the 10-year nominal and real bonds from these
yields.
Results I now turn to the estimation results. Figure 1.1 plots the point esti-
mates of the nominal and real bond betas with 95 percent confidence intervals.
The two vertical lines indicate two major UK monetary policy changes that
took place in the 1990s: the introduction of inflation targeting in October 1992
and the independence of the Bank of England in May 1997.
There are two things to note here. First, the nominal bond beta fell to zero
after the Bank of England obtained independence. That is, 10-year nominal
bond returns and equity returns were previously positively correlated, and this
correlation disappeared after independence. Note that we do not observe a
similar break when inflation targeting was introduced.
Second, the real bond beta also shows similar behavior, although the real
bond beta was not statistically different from zero throughout most of the sam-
ple period. That is, 10-year real bond returns and equity returns were barely
correlated throughout the sample period. I attempt to interpret these results
through the lens of the model presented in the next section.
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1.3 A New Keynesian Model with Recursive
Preferences and Trend Inflation
1.3.1 Overview
The model is a simple New Keynesian model with two features: recursive pref-
erences and positive trend inflation (i.e., a positive rate of inflation in the deter-
ministic steady state). As shown by Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and van
Binsbergen et al. (2012), a dynamic general equilibrium model with recursive
preferences (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1989) can
account for several moments of the nominal yield curve, such as the average
slope of the curve.
I include positive trend inflation without indexation into the model, because
one of my interpretations of the Bank of England’s independence is as an event
that lowered the level of trend inflation. Trend inflation affects the properties
of asset prices in the model. For example, the inflation risk premium is slightly
larger when trend inflation is higher, because the uncertainty (proxied by the
volatility) of inflation rises with the level of trend inflation. This is broadly
consistent with the empirical findings about the relationship between inflation
uncertainty and term premia reported by Wright (2011). Goto (2013) examines
the relationship between the level of trend inflation and asset prices. In the
remainder of this section, I describe the model in detail.
1.3.2 Households









where ut ≡ Cαt (1 − Nt)1−α denotes the current utility flow that consists of
consumption, Ct, and leisure, 1−Nt. CEt+1 denotes the certainty equivalent of







where γ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.9 EIS denotes the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution. The lifetime utility consists of the current
utility flow and the certainty equivalent of the expected future lifetime utility,
aggregated by the CES function. If γ = 1/EIS, the preferences revert to the
standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences.
1.3.3 Final Good Firms
Competitive firms combine intermediate goods to produce the final good, Yt,










, ε > 1, (1.1)
where Yi,t, i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the intermediate good i and ε denotes the elasticity
of substitution across intermediate goods. Profit maximization leads to the







9The specification here follows van Binsbergen et al. (2012) and Gourio (2012). As shown
by Swanson (2012), γ is not in general equal to the coefficient of relative risk aversion, when
the household can vary its labor supply in response to shocks. In the current specification,
however, γ happens to be equal to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. See Example 2 in
Section 3.3 of Swanson (2013).
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where Pi,t denotes the price of the intermediate good i. Substitute (2.4) into








1.3.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i produces the good using the linear technology
Yi,t = AtNi,t,
where At denotes the level of aggregate technology, which evolves according to
the following law of motion:
logAt = ρa logAt−1 + σaεa,t
where σaεa,t is an independently and identically distributed technology shock
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σa. Firm i supplies its product
to meet the demand according to (2.4), and sets the price as in Calvo (1983):
Pi,t =
{
Pi,t−1 with probability θ
P̃t with probability 1− θ,










Here, θj is the probability that the reset price P̃t remains effective in time t+ j,
st the real marginal cost, and M
$
t,t+j the product of the nominal stochastic
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discount factors:




















1.3.5 Monetary Policy and Long-Run Inflation
Monetary policy rule The monetary authority sets the short-term nominal













where R∗ is the steady-state level of the short-term interest rate, Y ∗ is the
steady-state level of output, and Π∗ is the steady-state level of gross inflation,
which can be larger than 1.
Trend Inflation without Indexation In introducing positive trend infla-
tion, I assume no indexation. That is, firms that do not re-optimize their
prices continue to use their existing prices, rather than increasing them by the
rate of inflation. The assumption of no indexation is consistent with microeco-
nomic evidence on price adjustments documented by Bils and Klenow (2004)
and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). Cogley and Sbordone (2008) also find
empirical evidence against indexation; they find that indexation is unnecessary
to explain the inflation dynamics using a New Keynesian model once the model
allows variations in trend inflation.
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1.3.6 Equilibrium
The economy’s resource constraint is Yt = Ct. An equilibrium is a collection of
stochastic processes,(




such that household and firm problems are solved, markets clear, the policy
rate is set according to the monetary policy rule, and the resource constraint is
satisfied.
1.3.7 Asset Prices
In this subsection I describe the asset price implication of the model. All asset
prices satisfy the same asset pricing equation, which is derived from the first-
order condition of the household problem. Suppose that the payoff of an asset






where Mt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor defined above. In the following
I describe how I compute the price of equity and long-term nominal and real
bonds, which I use in turn to compute the stock market betas of the nominal
and real bonds.
Equity The equity is modeled as a claim to aggregate output. The ex-


















Bond The government bond is modeled as a default-free zero-coupon bond.









whereM$t,t+1 denotes the nominal stochastic discount factor. The holding period




















Beta The stock market beta of an n-period nominal bond is given by
R$t,t+1 −Rft,t+1 = α + β(Rwt,t+1 −R1t,t+1) + εt+1,
and the beta of a n-period real bond is given by:
Rt,t+1 −R1t,t+1 = α + β(Rwt,t+1 −R1t,t+1) + εt+1.
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1.3.8 Interpreting the Bank of England’s Independence
as a Parameter Change
In this section, I discuss my interpretation of the consequences of the Bank of
England’s independence in May 1997. I interpret the policy change as an event
that alters one or more of the following parameters in the monetary policy rule:
the inflation gap coefficient, the output gap coefficient, and the level of trend
inflation. In the following, I first give the relevant historical background and
then explain why I interpret the policy change in this manner.
On May 6, 1997, the UK government announced that it would grant oper-
ational independence to the Bank of England. Since then, the newly created
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has been responsible for independently set-
ting the policy rate.
The purpose of granting independence was to increase the credibility of the
Bank of England’s inflation targeting policy, which was adopted in October
1992 (McCafferty, 2013) but had not been regarded as fully credible because
the Chancellor of the Exchequer was responsible for interest rate decisions, sug-
gesting that short-term political pressures could influence decisions (Martijn and
Samiei, 1999; Gürkaynak et al., 2010). Indeed, Lane and Samiei (1997) examine
minutes of monetary policy meetings between the Chancellor of the Exchequer
and the Governor of the Bank of England and document multiple occasions
when the Chancellor either cut or kept the policy rate constant, contrary to the
Governor’s suggestion to raise it.
The announcement was made four days after the Labour Party’s election
win, and it was a surprise to most, if not all, people. Even a news report a few
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hours before the announcement failed to mention anything about independence
but instead mooted a likely increase in the policy rate by 25 basis points, which
turned out to be true (Loftus, 1997). As discussions regarding the Bank of
England’s independence were held before the announcement (Roll Committee,
1993), its content might have been expected. However, as Spiegel (1998) argues,
the timing of the announcement was certainly unexpected.
Financial markets reacted strongly to the announcement. The 10-year break-
even inflation rate dropped 28 basis points on the date. The reaction was
huge, compared with the average daily change of the break-even inflation during
this period: 0.4 basis points.10 Gürkaynak et al. (2010) and Wright (2011)
document similar large declines in long-term nominal forward rates. Wright
(2011) also documents little change in the real forward curve. These market
reactions suggest that the announcement lowered inflation expectations and the
term premium.
Given the surprising nature of the announcement, I interpret the policy
change as sudden changes in some parameter(s) in the model. The object of
and the actual reactions for the policy change suggest some structural changes in
the monetary policy rule. I thus consider changes in one or more of the following
parameters in the monetary policy rule: the inflation gap coefficient, the output
gap coefficient, and the level of trend inflation. As shown in Figures 1.6, 1.7,
and 1.8, these parameter changes are consistent with the immediate changes in
the break-even inflation documented in the literature.
10The average is from January through May 1997.
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1.4 Parameterization and the Solution Method
In this section I discuss parameterization and the solution method.
1.4.1 Parameterization
Table 1.1 lists the baseline parameter values. These values are in line with
those used in the literature. The model is a quarterly model. I set β = 0.995 so
that the steady-state annualized real interest rate is two percent. I set γ = 75.
As shown by Swanson (2012), this means that the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is α × γ = 0.5 × 75 = 37.5. The Calvo parameter is θ = 0.75 so that
the average duration of a price is four quarters, which is broadly consistent with
the empirical evidence reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The annual
rate of trend inflation is two percent. The standard deviation of technology
shocks is 0.005, while that of monetary policy shocks is 0.003.
1.4.2 Solution Method
I solve the model using a second-order perturbation method around its deter-
ministic steady state, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). A second-order
approximation is necessary for the model to generate a non-zero risk premium.11
An advantage of using perturbation methods is their efficiency. Though the
model has four state variables, it takes under 10 minutes to solve the model
using a standard laptop.
Since perturbation methods are local approximations, there is a possibility
11With a third- and higher-order approximation, the model generates a risk premium that
depends on the state variables.
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that accuracy may be sacrificed in exchange for computational efficiency. Cal-
dara et al. (2012), however, find that the accuracy of perturbation methods is
comparable with global methods, such as Chebyshev polynomials in the case of
a real business cycle model with recursive preferences, whose structure is similar
to the model presented in this paper. Nonetheless, I should point out that their
results may not necessarily apply to the model in this paper, since the accuracy
of local methods can, in principle, differ for each application.
In some simulations that I conduct below, I simulate a time-series path of
the approximate solution. In that case, I simulate a path by pruning out the
extraneous high-order terms, as in Kim et al. (2008).
1.5 Model Evaluation
In this section, I evaluate via simulation the new Keynesian model presented
above.. The criteria for evaluation is whether the model can account for the level
of nominal and real bond betas, both before and after the Bank of England’s
independence, as seen in Figure 1.1. In doing so, I simulate the model and
compute the two betas for different values of the coefficients of inflation gap and
output gap in the monetary policy rule, as well as the level of trend inflation.
(As argued in Section 1.3.8, I interpret the Bank of England’s independence as
the event that has changed one or more of these three parameters.) I present
simulation results by plotting the model-implied betas against each parameter,
as in Figure 1.4.
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1.5.1 Bond and Equity Pricing Implications of the Model
Before turning to the model-implied betas, I briefly discuss other bond and
equity pricing implications of the model. Table 1.2 lists several basic model-
implied bond and equity pricing moments along with the corresponding empir-
ical moments for UK data. The empirical moments are based on UK data from
1986 to 2010. The table shows that the model generates reasonably realistic
bond pricing moments: the slope of the nominal yield curve, the mean excess
returns to 10-year nominal bonds, and the standard deviation of excess returns
to 10-year nominal bonds. The model, on the other hand, cannot match equity
pricing moments. Although the mean UK equity premium is low during this
period, the long-run equity premium is much larger. According to Dimson et
al. (2008), the average UK equity premium for 1900 to 2005 is 5.29%, which is
much larger than the model-implied 0.17%. Also, the model predicts a much
smaller standard deviation for the equity premium.
1.5.2 Monetary Policy Rule and the Betas
Here I examine the role of the monetary policy rule on the nominal and real
bond betas. Specifically, I examine how the level of the nominal and real betas
varies for different values of the inflation gap coefficient, φπ, and the output
gap coefficient, φy, in the monetary policy rule. The analysis uncovers how the
central bank’s reaction to the inflation gap and the output gap is related to the
nominal and real bond betas.
Inflation Gap Coefficient Figure 1.3 shows how the level of the nominal
and real bond betas changes as the inflation gap coefficient increases from 1.2
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to 2.4. Changes in the inflation gap coefficient alter the dynamics of macro
aggregates. Most importantly, the volatility of inflation decreases, whereas the
volatility of output/consumption slightly increases.
There are three things to note in Figure 1.3. First, the level of the real bond
beta is close to 1 for the entire range of the inflation gap coefficient considered
here. This results from the fact that aggregate consumption does not vary so
much across different states of the model economy, and thus the behavior of
the equity price resembles the behavior of the real bond price. Although the
volatility of consumption is slightly higher for larger values of the inflation gap
coefficient, its quantitative effects are negligible, as can been in the figure.
Second, the level of the nominal bond beta is larger than 1, regardless of
the value of the inflation gap coefficient. This is because a technology shock is
the main shock in the model economy. When a positive technology shock hits
the economy, inflation falls, because firms face lower marginal costs. Since a
technology shock is persistent, a positive technology shock also lowers future
inflation expectations. Lower (unexpected) future inflation in turn raises the
nominal bond price. Thus, the nominal bond return changes more than the
equity return, with the result that the nominal bond beta is larger than 1.
Third, the model predicts that the nominal bond beta becomes smaller,
as the monetary authority reacts more aggressively to the short-run deviation
of inflation from the target (i.e., as the inflation gap coefficient increases). A
higher inflation gap coefficient reduces the volatility of inflation. In other words,
inflation changes to a lesser extent in response to shocks as the monetary author-
ity becomes more aggressive toward inflation development. Thus, the nominal
bond price also varies less in response to shocks, leading to the lower level of
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the nominal bond beta.
Discrepancies between the model and the data There are two discrep-
ancies between the model and the data. The first discrepancy is the level of
the nominal and real betas after the Bank of England gained its operational
independence. While the betas are zero in the data, the model predicts much
higher values for the betas. The zero betas in the data indicate that shocks
that affect equity returns do not affect bond returns. In the model, however,
the same set of shocks (technology shocks and monetary policy shocks) affect
bond and equity returns, and so some co-movement between bond and equity
returns, i.e., non-zero betas, is inevitable.
The second discrepancy relates to the ratio between the nominal and real
bond betas. The model predicts that the level of the nominal bond beta is
larger than the level of the real bond beta. In the data, however, there is no
statistically significant difference between the levels of the two betas. In other
words, the data suggest that the nominal bond and the real bond are essentially
the same for their return association with the equity, suggesting that shocks to
inflation affect nominal bond returns but not equity returns. The two economic
shocks in the model, however, affect both consumption and inflation at the same
time. Shocks to inflation, therefore, cannot affect only the nominal bond, and
thus a difference always exists between the levels of the nominal and real beta
bonds. In contrast to the nominal bond beta, the real bond beta varies little
for different values of the output gap coefficient, again resulting from the fact
that aggregate consumption does not vary much across different states of the
economy even for a low value of the output gap coefficient.
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Output gap coefficient The relationship between the output gap coefficient
and the nominal and real betas can be understood exactly the same way as
above, as long as it is recognized that there is a trade-off between inflation
stabilization and output stabilization. As the monetary authority becomes more
responsive to the output gap (i.e., as the output gap coefficient increases), the
volatility of output decreases and the volatility of inflation increases. This leads
to a larger response of inflation and thus a larger response of the nominal bond
price to a technology shock, leading to a higher level of the nominal bond beta.
1.5.3 Trend Inflation and the Betas
Here I examine the role of trend inflation on the nominal and real bond betas.
Specifically, I examine how the model-implied betas vary when trend inflation
changes from zero to six percent.
Figure 1.5 displays the effects of trend inflation on the nominal and real
bond betas. There are several things to note here. First, the real bond beta is
about one for the range of trend inflation considered here, and the logic is the
same as explained in the previous subsection. The only difference here is that
the real bond beta decreases slightly when the level of trend inflation exceeds
five percent. This occurs because the volatility of output increases non-linearly
as trend inflation rises (Amano et al., 2007). As a result, the cash flow of the
equity becomes more volatile, and the equity looks less similar to the real bond,
which leads to a lower level of the real bond beta. However, its quantitative
effects are not large as can be seen in the figure.
Second, the level of the nominal beta is higher for a higher level of trend
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inflation. As just explained, higher volatility of output due to high trend in-
flation leads to a lower level of the real bond beta. This also applies to the
nominal bond beta. However, higher trend inflation increases the volatility of
inflation at a greater rate. The volatility of inflation is larger for higher trend
inflation, because the dispersion of prices set by intermediate goods firms in-
creases with the level of trend inflation (without indexation). As a result, the
nominal bond price responds more to shocks under high trend inflation than
under low trend inflation, leading to a higher level of the beta. As an illus-
tration, Figure 1.11 displays dynamic responses of the 10-year nominal yield to
a positive one-standard-deviation technology shock for different levels of trend
inflation.
Discrepancies between the model and the data As in the case of the
coefficients in the monetary policy rule, the model is unable to explain the
dynamics of the nominal and real bond betas in Figure 1.1. As the analysis
in this section shows, the model cannot explain the data with changes in trend
inflation, and the same set of discrepancies remains. The first discrepancy is
the level of the nominal bond beta before the Bank of England’s independence.
The second discrepancy is the fact that both the nominal and real betas are
zero after independence. The third discrepancy is that the ratio of the nominal
and the real bond betas is 1 after independence. A detailed explanation of this
is given in Section 1.5.2.
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1.6 Sensitivity Analysis
The results reported above hold for a wide set of the parameter values. In this
section, I report the sensitivity of the nominal and real bond betas to several
parameters in the model.
1.6.1 Equity as a Claim to Levered Output
The equity can also be modeled as a claim to a levered output, as in Abel (1999).

















where λ is the degree to which an equity is levered with respect to wealth. The




A higher value of λ leads to a higher equity premium. For example, with λ =
3, the model-implied average excess equity return is 6.36% with the standard
deviation of 4.04%. As shown in Figure 1.12, with the leverage parameter of
eight, both the nominal and real betas are close to 0, as we see in the UK data
since 1997. However, the typical leverage parameter used in the literature is




CRRA parameter γ for the beta Figure 1.9 shows how the nominal and
real bond betas are related to the CRRA parameter γ. The figure shows that
high CRRA parameters do not change the levels of either the nominal or real
bond betas. Since the CRRA parameter affects the price of the risk, the quantity
of risk (betas) stays the same.
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution Figure 1.10 shows how the nom-
inal and real bond betas are related to the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion parameter. The figure shows that higher elasticity of substitution lowers
the level of the nominal bond beta but barely affects the level of the real bond
beta. The nominal beta is lower for higher EIS, because the volatility of inflation
also becomes higher. The real bond beta, on the other hand, is not sensitive to
the value of the EIS.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate a New Keynesian model using the time-varying stock
market betas of nominal and real government bonds. Using UK data, I doc-
ument a sharp change in the beta of the 10-year nominal bond when the UK
government gave operational independence to the Bank of England. Interpreting
the Bank of England’s independence as an event that changed the parameters
in the monetary policy rule, I examine whether a New Keynesian model with
recursive preferences can account for the level of nominal and real bond betas
both before and after independence. I find that the model generates much larger
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betas than we find in the data. Also, the model has difficulty in generating the
zero betas that we see in the data.
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Parameter Description Value
β Subjective time discount factor 0.995
γ CRRA parameter 75
ψ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.3
ε Elasticity of substitutions among intermediate goods 10
θ Calvo parameter 0.75
ρr Monetary policy inertia 0.7
φπ Coefficient of inflation gap 1.5
φy Coefficient of output gap 0.1
ρa AR(1) coefficient of a technology shock 0.95
σa Standard error of a technology shock 0.005
σm Standard error of a monetary policy shock 0.003
Table 1.1: Baseline parameter values
Moment UK data Model
Mean slope of the nominal curve 0.37 0.17
Mean excess return to 10-year nominal bonds 3.68 0.83
Std Dev of the excess return 10.05 10.90
Mean equity premium 0.61 0.17
Std Dev of equity premium 17.91 3.54
Table 1.2: Empirical and model-implied asset pricing moments
Note: The table lists the mean and the standard deviation of some bond and
equity pricing moments from the data and the model. Empirical moments are
based on UK data from 1986 to 2010. The unit is annualized return.














Figure 1.1: Quarterly estimated stock market betas of UK government bonds
Note: The figure plots quarterly estimated stock market betas for 10-year
nominal and real UK government bonds. The sample is 1986Q1 through
2010Q4. The first line indicates the timing of the introduction of inflation
targeting (October 1992), and the second line indicates the timing of the
independence of the Bank of England (May 1997).
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Introduction of inflation target
  Bank of England's independence
Figure 1.2: UK 10-year break-even inflation rate
Note: The figure plots the UK 10-year break-even inflation rate: the difference
between the yield of 10-year nominal gilt and the yield of 10-year
inflation-indexed gilt.
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Inflation gap coefficient in Taylor rule
Nominal
Real
Figure 1.3: Inflation gap coefficient and stock market betas of government bonds
Note: The figure plots the simulated stock market betas of the 10-year
nominal and real government bonds for the inflation gap coefficient in the
monetary policy rule from 1.2 to 2.4. The betas are simulated as follows.
First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a second-order perturbation
method. Second, I simulate a time series path of the approximated solution by
pruning out the extraneous high-order terms as in Kim et al. (2008). Third, I
estimate the betas by running regressions of either returns to nominal or real
government bonds on the equity return. I repeat this exercise for different
inflation gap coefficients of the monetary policy rule.
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Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule
Nominal
Real
Figure 1.4: Output gap coefficient and stock market betas of government bonds
Note: The figure plots the simulated stock market betas of the 10-year
nominal and real government bonds for the output gap coefficient in the
monetary policy rule from 1.2 to 2.4. The betas are simulated as follows.
First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a second-order perturbation
method. Second, I simulate a time series path of the approximated solution by
pruning out the extraneous high-order terms as in Kim et al. (2008). Third, I
estimate the betas by running regressions of either returns to nominal or real
government bonds on the equity return. I repeat this exercise for different
inflation gap coefficients of the monetary policy rule.
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Annual rate of trend inflation
Nominal
Real
Figure 1.5: Trend inflation and stock market betas of government bonds
Note: The figure plots the simulated stock market betas of the 10-year
nominal and real government bonds for annual rate of trend inflation from 0
to 6 percent. The betas are simulated as follows. First, the model (see Section
3) is solved by a second-order perturbation method. Second, I simulate a time
series path of the approximated solution by pruning out the extraneous
high-order terms as in Kim et al. (2008). Third, I estimate the betas by
running regressions of either returns to nominal or real government bonds on
the equity return. I repeat this exercise for different annual rate of trend
inflation.
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Annual rate of trend inflation
Figure 1.6: Trend inflation and the 10-year break-even inflation
Note: The figure plots the simulated 10-year break-even inflation for the
annual rate of trend inflation from 0 to 6 percent. The break-even inflation is
simulated as follows. First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a
second-order perturbation method. Second, I compute the model-implied
average 10-year nominal and real yield. The break-even inflation is the
difference between the nominal and the real yield.
‘
33












Inflation gap coefficient in Taylor rule
Figure 1.7: Inflation gap coefficient and the 10-year break-even inflation
Note: The figure plots the simulated 10-year break-even inflation for the
inflation gap coefficient in Taylor rule from 1.2 to 2.4. The break-even
inflation is simulated as follows. First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a
second-order perturbation method. Second, I compute the model-implied
average 10-year nominal and real yield. The break-even inflation is the
difference between the nominal and the real yield.
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Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule
Figure 1.8: Output gap coefficient and the 10-year break-even inflation
Note: The figure plots the simulated 10-year break-even inflation for the
output gap coefficient in Taylor rule from 0.1 to 0.5. The break-even inflation
is simulated as follows. First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a
second-order perturbation method. Second, I compute the model-implied
average 10-year nominal and real yield. The break-even inflation is the
difference between the nominal and the real yield.
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Figure 1.9: CRRA parameter and stock market betas of government bonds
The figure plots the simulated stock market betas of the 10-year nominal and
real government bonds for the CRRA parameter from 5 to 125. The betas are
simulated as follows. First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a
second-order perturbation method. Second, I simulate a time series path of
the approximated solution by pruning out the extraneous high-order terms as
in Kim et al. (2008). Third, I estimate the betas by running regressions of
either returns to nominal or real government bonds on the equity return. I
repeat this exercise for different CRRA parameters.
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Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Nominal bond beta
Real bond beta
Figure 1.10: EIS and stock market betas of government bonds
Note: The figure plots the simulated stock market betas of the 10-year
nominal and real government bonds for the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution parameter from 0.3 to 1.5. The betas are simulated as follows.
First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a second-order perturbation
method. Second, I simulate a time series path of the approximated solution by
pruning out the extraneous high-order terms as in Kim et al. (2008). Third, I
estimate the betas by running regressions of either returns to nominal or real
government bonds on the equity return. I repeat this exercise for different
CRRA parameters.
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Figure 1.11: Dynamic response of 10-year nominal yield to technology shock
Note: The figure plots the dynamic response of 10-year nominal yield to
positive one standard deviation technology shock for different rates of trend
inflation. The vertical axis is changes in the nominal yield in the annualized
percentage point.
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Leverage Parameter  
Nominal bond beta
Real bond beta
Figure 1.12: Leverage parameter, betas, and equity premium
The figure plots the simulated stock market betas of the 10-year nominal and
real government bonds for the leverage parameter λ from 1 to 8 as well as the
corresponding equity premium. The betas and the equity prermium are
simulated as follows. First, the model (see Section 3) is solved by a
second-order perturbation method. Second, I simulate a time series path of
the approximated solution by pruning out the extraneous high-order terms as
in Kim et al. (2008). Third, I estimate the betas by running regressions of
either returns to nominal or real government bonds on the equity return. I
compute the average equity return in excess of one-period risk-free rate. I
repeat this exercise for different leverage parameters.
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Chapter 2
Trend Inflation and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the effects of trend inflation on the term structure of interest
rates. I examine the effects on a number of aspects of the yield curve: the steady
state, the mean, the variance, impulse responses to economic shocks, and risk
compensation. I consider three different levels of trend inflation 2, 4, and 6
percent.
I find that higher rate of trend inflation leads to more volatile inflation,
which in turn increases the volatility of bond prices. The volatility of bond
prices increase regardless of the maturity of the bond. In addition, impulse
response of bond yields are larger for higher trend inflation. However, I also
find that the quantitative effects of these findings are quite small when we
assume the standard log utility of the representative household.
The quantitative effects of positive trend inflation become significant when
we assume the household with Epstein-Zin preferences. For example, the av-
erage slope of the yield curve is 1.02 percent for 2 percent inflation, while it
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is 1.35 percent for 6 percent trend inflation. Excess returns to 10-year bond
are 5.6 percent for 2 percent trend inflation and 6.7 percent for 6 percent trend
inflation.
The main conclusion of the paper is that the model implies that higher trend
inflation leads to more volatile inflation and bond yields. Higher trend inflation
leads to more risk premium of long term bonds. Many central banks in the world
have been struggling with the zero lower bound problem after the financial crisis
of 2007-2008.1 In response to this, some economics, notably Blanchard et al.
(2010) and Ball (2013), argue that central banks should target higher rate of
inflation. More risk premium in the long-term bond means more room to be hit
by the zero lower bound problem. However, my research shows that the benefits
come at the costs of more volatile inflation as well as bond yields.
Related research Previous studies find that trend inflation alters the dy-
namics of macro aggregates in the model and thus the properties of the model.2
Ascari (2004) studies the effects on the deterministic steady state as well as the
impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to economic shocks. Amano et
al. (2007) study the implications on the means and variances of macroeconomic
variables. Ascari and Ropele (2007) study the implications on the optimal
monetary policy. Nakata (2013) studies the welfare costs of time-varying trend
inflation. Kurozumi (2014) examines the implications on expectational stability
of rational expectations equilibrium.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
1An exception is the Bank of Japan which started facing the zero lower bound problem in
1990s.
2See Ascari and Sbordone (2013) for a review of the literature on trend inflation.
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discusses the solution method and the parameterization. Section 4 presents the
results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model is an otherwise simple New Keynesian model except that the steady
state level of inflation (henceforth, trend inflation) can be different from zero.3
The model consists of a representative household, goods-producing firms, and
a monetary authority. Bond prices satisfy the standard asset pricing equation.
2.2.1 Households
A representative household chooses consumption, labor supply, and bond hold-












subject to the budget constraint for each period
PtCt +Bt+1 ≤ WtNt +Rt−1,tBt + Tt.
Here Ct is consumption, Nt is labor supply, Pt is the final goods’ price (the
aggregate price level), Bt+1 is the dollar value of one-period nominal bonds held
by the household at the end of time t, Wt is the nominal wage, Rt−1,t is the
gross nominal interest rate, and Tt is nominal profits from intermediate goods
firms. Besides the budget constraint, the household’s optimal decision satisfies
the solvency condition: lim
T→∞
EtBT  0 for all t.
3See, for example, Section 2 of Christiano et al. (2010) for the simple New Keynesian
model without non-zero trend inflation.
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and the asset pricing equation
1 = Et (Mt,t+1Rt,t+1) , (2.2)
where Mt,t+1 denotes the nominal stochastic discount factor (SDF)





2.2.2 Final Goods Firm
Competitive firms combine intermediate goods to produce the final good, Yt,










, ε > 1, (2.3)
where Yi,t, i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the intermediate good i, and ε denotes the elasticity
of substitution across intermediate goods. Profit maximization leads to the







where Pi,t denotes the price of the intermediate goods i. Substitute (2.4) into









2.2.3 Intermediate Goods Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i produces the good using the following linear
technology
Yi,t = AtNi,t,
where At denotes the level of aggregate technology which evolves according to
the following stationary process:
logAt = ρa logAt−1 + σaεa,t,
where σaεa,t is an iid technology shock with mean zero and standard deviation
σa. Firm i supplies its product to meet the demand according to (2.4) and sets
the price as in Calvo (1983):
Pi,t =
{
Pi,t−1 with probability θ
P̃t with probability 1− θ,










θj is the probability that the reset price P̃t remains effective in time t+ j, st is
the real marginal cost,4 and Mt,t+j is the product of the nominal SDFs:







4Since Firm i’s real total cost is given by (WtYi,t)/(PtAt), the real marginal cost is given
by st ≡ Wt/(PtAt), which is common across intermediate firms.
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Ft = 1 + βθEt (Πt+1)
ε−1 Ft+1. (2.8)
Here Πt+1 is the gross rate of inflation between dates t and t+ 1.
Since the fraction 1 − θ of intermediate firms reset their prices, the price
index (2.5) can be rewritten as follows
Pt =
(































which can be rewritten as5
p∗t
(





5Use the Calvo pricing feature that the fraction 1 − θ of intermediate firms reset their
prices. Then divide the price index by Pt.
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2.2.4 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority sets the one-period nominal interest rate, Rt,t+1, ac-













where σmεm,t is an iid monetary policy shock with mean zero and standard
deviation σm. R
∗ and Y ∗ denote the steady-state levels of nominal interest rate
and output, when the steady-state level of gross inflation is Π∗.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
The economy’s resource constraint is
Yt = Ct. (2.13)
A symmetric equilibrium is a sequence of (Ct, Nt,Wt, Yt, Pt, Rt,t+1, Pi,t, Yi,t, Ni,t,Πt)
∞
t=0
such that household and firm problems are solved, all markets clear, the policy
rate is set according to the monetary policy rule, and the resource constraint is
satisfied. The equilibrium conditions are (2.1), (2.2), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9),
(2.11), (2.10), (2.12), and (2.13).
2.2.6 Bond prices, yields, and returns
Bond prices satisfy the asset pricing equation (2.2) which is reproduced here in
a slightly different form:
Pt = Et (Mt,t+1xt+1) ,
where Pt is the price of the asset, Mt,t+1 is the SDF, and xt+1 is the payoff of
the asset. The price of a default-free n-period zero-coupon bond that pays a
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t = − logRt,t+1.
The risk-neutral bond price is defined as the price discounted by the current
























In studying how the level of trend inflation affects the term structure, I
examine the implications on three measures of risk compensation embedded in
bond prices: the slope of the yield curve and the excess returns on long-term
bonds. The slope of the yield curve is given by
y
(40)
t − y(1)t .











In reporting yields and returns, I multiply by 400 to make it in units of annu-
alized percentage points.
6For example, see Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
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2.3 Solution method and parametrization
I solve the model using a second-order perturbation method around its deter-
ministic steady state as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).7 A second-order
approximation is necessary for the model to generate a non-zero risk premium
under the current setting. Although perturbation methods are local approxima-
tions, Caldara et al. (2012) find that the accuracy of perturbation methods is
comparable with several global methods such as Chebyshev polynomials in the
case of a real business cycle model with recursive preferences, whose structure
is quite similar to the present model.
Table 2.2 lists the baseline parameter values which are in line with those
used in the literature. The model is a quarterly model.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Results for household with log utility
This subsection summarizes the results for household with log utility. The main
conclusion of this part is that while trend inflation affects the dynamics of macro
variables as well as bond prices, its quantitative effects are fairly small. Table
2.1 lists the steady state values, means, and standard deviations of consump-
tion, inflation, policy rate, 5-year rate, and 10-year for three different levels
of trend inflation: 2, 4, and 6 percent per year. There are four observations
from the table worth emphasizing. First, the steady state value of consumption
goes down as trend inflation increases. This is because the price dispersion,
7See Table 2.1 for the detail about the deterministic steady state.
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the source of inefficiency in the model, is higher for higher level of trend infla-
tion (Ascari, 2004). Second, the volatility of inflation is larger for higher trend
inflation. As the level of trend inflation increases, the dispersion of prices in-
crease, leading to more volatile inflation. Third, the model-implied yield curve
is hump-shaped. The average 5-year slope is 0.01 percent for 2 percent trend
inflation and 0.02 percent for 6 percent trend inflation. The average 10-year
slope is −0.021 percent for 2 percent trend inflation and −0.025 percent for
6 percent trend inflation. Fourth, while the level of trend inflation does affect
both macroeconomic variables and bond prices, its quantitative effects are fairly
small for the model presented above.
Figure 3.5 delivers the same message from a different angle. The figure shows
the impulse responses to positive technology shock for consumption, inflation,
policy rate, 5-year rate, and 10-year rate. For all the variables, the figure shows
that impulse responses are larger for higher trend inflation. For example, an
increase in consumption is larger for the case of 6% trend inflation than 4%
trend inflation. However, the quantitative differences in impulse responses are
fairly small.
2.4.2 Results for household with Epstein-Zin preferences
In this section, I study how the effects of trend inflation changes when the
representative household has Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989).
I focus on the effects on asset prices, as Epstein-Zin preferences does not alter
the first-order dynamics of macroeconomic variables in the model (Rudebusch
and Swanson, 2012).
Instead of the log utility, the representative household now has the following
49





t + β (CEt+1)
1−1/EIS
)(1−1/EIS)−1
where ut ≡ Cαt (1 − Nt)1−α denotes the current utility flow that consists of
consumption Ct and leisure 1 − Nt. CEt+1 denotes the certainty equivalent of







where γ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.8 EIS denotes the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution. The lifetime utility consists of the current
utility flow and the certainty equivalent of the expected future lifetime utility,
aggregated by the CES function. If γ = 1/EIS, the preferences reduces to the
standard Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences. The nominal


















Table 2.4 summarizes the results and lists the means and standard devia-
tions of policy rate, 5-year rate, and 10-year rate for 2 percent, 4 percent, and 6
percent trend inflation. There are x observations from the table worth empha-
sizing. First, all rates become more volatile for higher rate of trend inflation.
For example, the standard deviation of 10-year rate is 1.5 percent for 2 percent
trend inflation and 2.2 percent for 6 percent trend inflation. Second, the av-
erage slope of the yield curve is higher for higher level of trend inflation. The
8The specification here follows van Binsbergen et al. (2012) and Gourio (2012). As shown
by Swanson (2012), γ is not in general equal to the coefficient of relative risk aversion, when
the household can vary its labor supply in response to shocks. In the current specification,
however, γ happens to be equal to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. See Example 2 in
Section 3.3 of Swanson (2013).
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average slope is 1.02 percent for 2 percent trend inflation and 1.35 percent for
6 percent trend inflation. Third, the average excess returns of 10-year bond are
also higher for higher rate of trend inflation. The average excess returns are 5.6
percent for 2 percent trend inflation, while the excess returns are 6.7 percent
for 6 percent trend inflation (see Figure 2.2).
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of trend inflation on the term structure of interest
rates. I find that trend inflation increases the volatility of inflation as well as that
of bond yields. Higher trend inflation also increases the risk premium. However,
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K See Equation (2.6) p̃F
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Table 2.1: Deterministic steady state
Parameter Description Value
β Subjective time discount factor 0.998
ϕ Frisch elasticity of labor supply 10
ε Elasticity of substitutions among intermediate goods 1.5
θ Calvo parameter 0.75
ρr Monetary policy inertia 0.8
φπ Coefficient of inflation gap 1.8
φy Coefficient of output gap 0.1
ρa AR(1) coefficient of a technology shock 0.9
σa Standard error of a technology shock 0.01
σm Standard error of a monetary policy shock 0.005
Π∗ Steady state level of trend inflation 1.040.25
Table 2.2: Baseline parameter values
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S.S. Mean Std. Dev. S.S. Mean Std. Dev. S.S. Mean Std. Dev.
Consumption 1.000 0.998 0.032 0.999 0.997 0.033 0.998 0.995 0.033
Inflation 2.000 2.305 2.664 4.000 4.343 2.703 6.000 6.388 2.744
Policy rate 2.820 3.028 1.471 4.836 5.080 1.504 6.852 7.139 1.539
5-year rate 2.820 3.028 1.320 4.836 5.080 1.352 6.852 7.139 1.387
10-year rate 2.820 2.472 0.640 4.836 4.490 0.657 6.852 6.510 0.675
2 percent annural inflation 4 percent inflation 6 percent inflation
Table 2.3: Steady states, means, and variances (Log utility)
Note: The table lists steady states, means, and standard deviations of
consumption, inflation, and bond yields for various trend inflation. Inflation
and bond yields are expressed annualized percentage points.
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Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Policy rate 1.564 2.539 3.606 2.682 6.545 2.946
5-year rate 2.206 1.945 4.250 2.161 7.192 2.604
10-year rate 2.588 1.511 4.710 1.715 7.895 2.248
2 percent inflation 4 percent inflation 6 percent inflation
Table 2.4: Means, and variances (Epstein-Zin)
Note: The table lists means and standard deviations of various bond yields for
three different levels of trend inflation. Bond yields are expressed annualized
percentage points.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to positive technology shock
Note: The table lists steady states, means, and standard deviations of
consumption, inflation, and bond yields for various trend inflation. Inflation
and bond yields are expressed annualized percentage points.
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Mean excess returns of 10-yr nominal bond
Trend inflation
Figure 2.2: Average excess returns to 10-year bond (annualized percentage
points) in the case of Epstein-Zin preferences.
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Chapter 3
FDI and the Welfare Gains from
Financial Integration
3.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows account for more than 40 percent of for-
eign capital going into developing countries. Together with debt flows, the two
types of financial flows constitute almost all the foreign capital that developing
countries accept.1 The benefits and costs of FDI and debt flows have naturally
become an active research topic in international macroeconomics.2 This paper
aims to contribute to this literature by studying the welfare consequences of
foreign capital flows, in particular FDI flows.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) study the welfare effects of liberalizing debt
flows using the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model and find that the liberal-
ization increases permanent consumption by only one percent.3 When a country
borrows from abroad, it can accumulate capital more rapidly and shorten the
time to reach the steady state than otherwise, resulting in higher economic
1See Table 1 in Kose et al. (2009).
2See, for example, Kose et al. (2009) and papers cited therein.
3Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965).
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growth and welfare. However, the growth effects are short-lived and small, be-
cause the liberalization of debt flows does not change the steady state itself,
and the benefits disappear in the long-run.
Given the results about debt flows, this paper studies the welfare gains
from liberalizing FDI flows using an extended Ramsey growth model. The key
assumption which is grounded in empirical studies is that FDI flows bring more
advanced technology to a host country, which enables workers employed by
foreign firms earn more than those employed by domestic firms. This paper
then studies additional welfare gains from liberalizing debt flows as well as FDI
flows to assess the relative importance of FDI flows and to evaluate the overall
benefits from financial integration (i.e., liberalizing all kinds of foreign capital
flows). This paper also conducts a number of sensitivity analysis given the large
differences among developing countries and a few notable changes in the world
economic environment. For example, I examine the consequences of a decline in
the world real interest rate, the recent phenomena that have occurred in many
parts of the world.
There are three main conclusions from the analysis. First, liberalizing FDI
flows can increase permanent consumption substantially. Under the baseline pa-
rameter values, the liberalization increases permanent consumption more than
four percent. On the other hand, liberalizing debt flows under the same speci-
fication only increases permanent consumption by half a percent. That is, this
paper highlights the relative importance of FDI flows over debt flows. Second,
the welfare gains from financial integration (liberalizing all kinds of foreign cap-
ital) can be substantial, although further gains from liberalizing debts flows in
addition to FDI flows are limited. Under the baseline specifications, 80 percent
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of gains come from the liberalization of FDI flows. Third, a decline in the world
real interest rate increases the welfare gains from financial integration, which
suggests that the recent change in the world economic environment actually
have increased the value of financial integration.
This paper is most closely related to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) as dis-
cussed above. This paper is also closely related to Hoxha et al. (2013). They
study welfare gains from financial integration using the otherwise standard neo-
classical growth model in which capital varieties exist as in Romer (1990). With
a value of the elasticity of substitution among capital that is consistent with
empirical literature, they find that financial integration can increase permanent
consumption by more than nine percent.
This paper is also related to a large empirical literature on financial glob-
alization and in particular on FDI. Kose et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive
review of the literature on financial globalization. Alfaro and Johnson (2012),
Javorcik (2012), and Kalemli-Ozcan and Villegas-Sanchez (2012) review the
literature on the effects of FDI flows. Morarn (2006) provides numerous case
studies of foreign direct investments conducted in developing countries.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses calibration. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 presents
the results of various sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 The models of financial integration
I use a variant of the small open economy version of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
growth model to study the welfare gains from various kinds of financial inte-
gration. In the following subsections, I consider four different cases of financial
integration (including financial autarky) and present the corresponding four
models. First, I present the model of financial autarky. Second, I present the
model for the first case of financial integration where the economy accepts only
debt flows from abroad. Third, I present the model for the second case of fi-
nancial integration where the economy accepts only foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows. Finally, I present the model for the final case of financial integra-
tion where the economy accepts both debt and FDI flows. Besides describing
the models, I discuss how I obtain the sequence of optimal consumption to
compute the lifetime utility.
3.2.1 Financial autarky
In this subsection, I consider the case of financial autarky (i.e., the closed econ-
omy) which serves as the benchmark for assessing the welfare gains from fi-
nancial integration. The economy is populated by a representative household.
Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .), and there is no uncertainty. The representative







subject to the resource constraint
Ct + It = Yt
⇒ Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt = Kαt (AtLt)1−α,
given the initial level of capital K0 > 0.
4 Here Ct is consumption, It is invest-
ment, Lt is labor supply, Yt is output, and At is the level of technology which
grows at rate g ≡ At+1/At, i.e., At = A0gt. δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
The size of population (labor supply) is fixed at 1, i.e., Lt = 1 for all periods.
















t+1 + 1− δ
)
is the gross return on investment between
time t and t+1. Since the aggregate consumption grows at rate g in the steady
state, the Euler equation implies that the gross interest rate in the steady state
is given by
R∗ = β−1gγ. (3.2)
Following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), I call this interest rate the natural
gross rate of interest.
Let ct ≡ Ct/AtLt = Ct/At denote the consumption per efficiency unit of
labor and kt ≡ Kt/At denote the capital per efficiency unit of labor. The Euler
4Throughout the paper, I assume that the initial level of capital per efficiency unit of
labor is smaller than the steady state level so that the country imports capital from abroad
whenever possible.
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Since consumption per efficiency unit of labor ct remains constant in the steady
state, we can derive the steady state level of capital per efficiency unit of labor














Using the resource constraint, we can express the steady state level of con-
sumption per efficiency unit of labor in terms of capital per efficiency unit of
labor:
c∗ = (k∗)α + (1− δ − g)k∗.
Given k0 < k
∗, the economy converges to (c∗, k∗) over time by accumulating
capital. To compute the actual optimal consumption path, I rely on a numerical
method which I describe in the appendix.
3.2.2 Financial integration: open to debt flows
In this subsection, I consider a case of financial integration under which the
economy accepts only debt flows from abroad. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)
examine this form of financial integration. The economy can borrow at the world
interest rate, and the rest of the world is composed of developed countries that
have already achieved their steady states, meaning that the world interest rate
is equal to the natural gross rate of interest R∗ defined in Equation (3.2).
In this economy, the representative household chooses the sequence of con-
sumption, capital stock, and net foreign asset {Ct, Kt+1, Bt+1} to maximize the
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lifetime utility (3.1) subject to the resource constraint
Bt+1 + Ct + It = Yt +R
∗Bt
⇒ Bt+1 + Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt = Kαt A1−αt +R∗Bt,
given the initial level of capital K0 > 0 and net foreign asset B0 = 0.
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In this form of financial integration, the level of capital per efficiency unit of
labor jumps to its steady state level in the initial period, because the represen-
tative household has an incentive to borrow money from abroad and accumulate
capital until the condition R∗ = αKα−1t+1 A
1−α
t+1 + 1 − δ holds so that the Euler
equation holds. Thus, the benefit of this form of financial integration is the
acceleration of the time to arrive at the steady state, which involves temporary
acceleration of economic growth and hence lead to higher lifetime utility.
Since the capital stock immediately reaches to the steady state level and con-
sumption grows at rate g for all periods, we can obtain a closed form expression
for the initial level of aggregate consumption:
C0 = (R
∗ − g)K0 + (1− α)(k∗)αA0. (3.4)
The appendix shows the derivation.
3.2.3 Financial integration: open to FDI flows
In this subsection, I consider a case of financial integration under which the
economy accepts only FDI flows. A key assumption is that FDI flows into a
host country with superior technology developed in advanced countries. To
5If the country borrows on net, Bt is negative.




represent this point in the model, I distinguish between domestic and foreign
capital which operate with the corresponding technology. The total capital in
the economy is thus the sum of domestic capital and foreign capital:
Kt ≡ Kht +Kft .
Foreigners own foreign capital and receive the rental price of capital. Both
domestic and foreign capital depreciates at the same rate δ:
Kht+1 = (1− δ)Kht + Iht
Kft+1 = (1− δ)Kft + Ift .
Ift is interpreted as foreign direct investments. The total labor in the economy
is also divided into foreign compatible labor and domestic labor:
Lt ≡ Lht + Lft .
The foreign compatible labor is more skilled than domestic labor and can work
for both foreign and domestic companies. An example of foreign compatible
labor is workers in South Africa who work at assembly plants of automobile
makes such as Volkswagen or BMW (Morarn, 2006). The foreign compatible
labor is scarce and accounts for a fraction θ of the total labor:
Lft ≡ θLt, 0 < θ < 1.
The aggregate output is the sum of the output from domestic and foreign sectors:

















Both the domestic technology and the foreign technology grow at the same
rate g with the initial condition Af0 > A
h
0 > 0. That is, the level is the only
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difference between the two kinds of technology. If I instead assumed that the
foreign technology grows at a faster rate than the domestic technology, the ratio
between the two technologies, Aft /A
h
t , would go to infinity over time, which is
counterfactual.
When a country accepts FDI flows, the foreign compatible workers work for
the foreign-owned company, because they can get higher wages from the foreign











The representative household chooses the sequence of consumption and capital






















given K0 > 0.
7This is true for the baseline parameter values. The appendix shows the condition that
this statement is true.
8A Handbook chapter by Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) lists a number of papers
which find wage gaps between domestic and foreign companies that may reflect higher pro-
ductivity level of foreign companies. According to Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), the
unconditional wage gap is typically large. For example, the gap is 40% for the case of Hungary
and 50% for Brazil. The wage gap after controlling for worker and firm characteristics are
much smaller. Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) report, however, that most studies find
at least some wage premium even after controlling for worker and firm characteristics. See
papers cited therein for detail.
9Note that while the foreign wage is higher than the domestic wage, it is still a competitive
wage in the sense that foreign firms pay the marginal product of foreign-compatible labor. As
long as foreign firms can freely enter the market, this assumption seems plausible.
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Foreign capital flows into the country, until it is paid its marginal product.
Thus, foreign capital stock per efficiency unit of labor jumps to the steady state






R∗ − 1 + δ
)1/(1−α)
, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The wage for foreign compatible workers thus becomes
wft = (1− α)
(
α
R∗ − 1 + δ
)α/(1−α)
Aft
= (1− α)(k∗)αAft .
The domestic firm continues to rent the capital inside the country, until the






R∗ − 1 + δ
)1/(1−α)
.
To obtain the optimal consumption path, I rely on a numerical method. I
describe the method in detail in the appendix.
3.2.4 Financial integration: open to debt and FDI flows
In this subsection, I consider a case of financial integration under which the
economy accepts both debt and FDI flows. In this case, the representative
household chooses the sequence of consumption, capital stock, and net foreign
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asset {Ct, Kt+1, Bt+1} to maximize the lifetime utility (3.1) subject to the fol-
lowing resource constraint






















givenK0 > 0 and B0 = 0. For the reasons explained in the previous subsections,
both domestic and foreign capital per efficiency unit of labor jump to their












for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . We can show that the initial level of consumption is given by
C0 = (R
∗ − g)K0 + (1− α)(k∗)α
(
θAf0 + (1− θ)Ah0
)
, (3.5)
where k∗ is the steady state level of capital per efficiency unit of labor. See the
appendix for the derivation. Since consumption grows at rate g, it is easy to
obtain the whole sequence of optimal consumption.
3.3 Calibration
3.3.1 Parameter values
Table 3.1 lists the baseline parameter values. The values chosen for the discount
factor, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the capital share, the depreciation
rate, and the technological growth rate are close to the values often used in the
literature.
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The discount factor β = 0.96 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ = 2 together imply that the natural gross rate of interest R∗ = 1.0543. The
world real interest has been recently falling, and I will explore its implication
on the welfare gains from financial integration below.
The fraction of foreign-compatible labor, θ = 0.2, as well as the ratio of
foreign and domestic technology, Af0/A
h
0 = 1.2, are somewhat difficult parame-
ters to calibrate, since developing countries are substantially different from each
other in terms of the share of educated workers (i.e., foreign-compatible labor)
as well as the level of technology.10 For example, the share of foreign-compatible
labor probably depends on the fraction of educated workers among total workers
in the country. The average level of education, however, greatly varies across
10The baseline values of these two parameters are determined as follows. In the steady
state, the ratio of the domestic wage and the foreign wage is equal to the ratio of the level of







According to a Handbook chapter by Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), the foreign wage
premium estimated by many empirical studies, though the range is wide, is between 5 percent
and 50 percent. Suppose it is a mid point of the estimates and 20 percent, i.e., Aft /A
h
t = 1.2.
In the steady state, foreign capital stock per efficiency unit of labor is equal to domestic
















The ratio of foreign capital and the domestic capital in developing countries is about 4 ac-
cording to Kim et al. (2008), leading to
1− θ
θ
= 4 · 1.2. (3.9)
Solving this for θ, we get θ = 1/5.8 ≈ 0.2.
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countries (Barro and Lee, 2013). Given the large differences across developing
countries, I will discuss in detail how the main results change for other reason-
able range of values for these parameters. I will also conduct similar sensitivity
analysis for some other parameters.
3.3.2 Measuring the welfare gains from financial integra-
tion
As in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), I measure the welfare gains from finan-
cial integration by the percentage increase in consumption at all periods that
equalizes the welfare under autarky and the welfare under financial integration







where U i and Ua denote the welfare under financial integration and under au-
tarky.11 In the next section, I discuss how the welfare gains depend on the types
of financial integration.
3.4 Main results
In this section, I present the main results. After providing the overview of the
results, I explain the sources of welfare gains in detail.




t(Cat (1 + h))
1−γ/(1 − γ) = ∑∞t=0 βt(Cit)1−γ/(1 − γ) where Cat and Cit denote
the consumption under autarky and under financial integration. In the case of log utility, the
Hicksian equivalent variation is given by h = exp((1− β)(U i − Ua))− 1.
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3.4.1 Overview of the main results
In Figure 3.1, I plot the welfare gains from three types of financial integration
against the initial level of capital based on the parameter values listed in Table
3.1. The figure confirms the finding by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006); the
welfare gains from liberalizing debt flows are quite limited. Even when the
initial level of capital is about 30 percent below the steady state level, i.e.,
K0 = 3, the welfare gain is only about 0.5 percentage increase in aggregate
consumption. The figure, on the other hand, shows that the welfare gains from
liberalizing FDI flows can be substantial. With the same level of initial capital,
the welfare gain from liberalizing FDI flows is four percent which is eight fold of
the welfare gain from liberalizing debt flows. The figure also shows that further
gain from liberalizing debt flows in addition to FDI flows is not large. For a
wide range of initial level of capital, the additional gain is less than one percent
of aggregate consumption.
3.4.2 Detailed explanation of the results
In this subsection, I provide a detailed explanation as to why FDI flows bring
large welfare gains as described in the previous subsection. To understand the
mechanism, first note that FDI flows bring two benefits. First, FDI flows speeds
up the accumulation of total capital in the economy, because foreign-owned
capital reaches to the steady state level immediately after the country accepts
FDI flows. Second, FDI flows come with advanced technology which enables
foreign-compatible workers to earn more, contributing to higher consumption
and thus welfare.
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Of these two channels, the effects of the latter is significantly more important.
To make this point, I plot the sequence of optimal consumption for three kinds
of financial integration in Fig 3.2: financial autarky, when the economy accepts
only debt flows, and when the economy accepts only FDI flows. Contrary to
the baseline parameters, I assume no difference in the levels of domestic and
foreign technology to show the (un)importance of the first channel.12 Since
there is no difference between domestic and foreign technology, the welfare gain
from allowing FDI flows comes entirely from the first channel. In this case, the
welfare gains from allowing FDI flows is just 0.91 percent, whereas the welfare
gain under the baseline parameters is four percent. That is, 80 percent of welfare
gains come from the fact that foreign technology is more superior to domestic
technology, and only 20 percent of welfare gains come from the fact that foreign
capital reaches instantly to the steady state level. Therefore, the figure shows
that the effects of allowing FDI flows are higher, if the flows come with more
advanced technology. It also shows that the capital accumulation effects are
temporary.
To see the importance of superior technology that comes with foreign capi-
tal, in Figure 3.4, I plot the sequence of optimal consumption for Af0 = 1.1 and
Af0 = 1.2. The figure shows that FDI with better technology increases aggre-
gate consumption permanently. This permanent effect is the source of the large
welfare gain from liberalizing FDI flows. Since the wage for foreign-compatible
workers is linear in the level of foreign technology, when the level of foreign
12All the other parameters are the same as the baseline values. The initial level of capital
is set to Kh0 = 2.5.
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technology is higher than the level of domestic technology by x percent, aggre-
gate consumption increases approximately by xθ percent. For example, when
Af0 = 1.2 and θ = 0.2, aggregate consumption increases by about four percent
as the baseline result shows.
3.5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section I conduct several sensitivity analysis to present how the main
results vary with the parameter values.
3.5.1 A decline in the world real interest rate
In this subsection, I examine how a decline in the world real interest rate affects
the welfare gains from financial integration. Recent worldwide decline in real
interest rates has created numerous discussions among policymakers about its
causes and implications (Furceri and Pascatori, 2014). The analysis in this sub-
section provides additional implication of this actively discussed phenomenon.
The model’s world real interest rate is given by R∗ = β−1gγ, and thus a de-
cline in the interest rate can happen if the technological growth rate g declines.13
Lower technological growth rate decreases the need to smooth consumption over
time and so lowers the interest rate. In the following I show how this parameter
change affects the welfare gains from financial integration.
13Of course, the model’s world real interest rate also declines if the other two parameters
change. First case is an increase in the time discount factor β. If households become more
patient (higher β), they have more incentive to consume less today and save for the future,
leading to a lower interest rate. Second case is a decrease in the coefficient of relative risk
aversion γ. Since households have CRRA preferences, lower risk aversion means that house-
holds are more willing to substitute consumption over time, which lowers the interest rate.
Here I focus on the change in the technological growth rate, since there is little evidence of
long-term changes in the time discount factor and/or the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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The welfare gains from financial integration increase when the technologi-
cal growth rate g declines. To see this, first note that the parameter change
increases the steady state level of capital per efficiency unit of labor (3.3), mean-
ing that a decrease in the world real interest rate widens the distance between
the initial level of capital and the steady state level. Thus, shortening the time
to reach the steady state by accepting debt flows and/or FDI flows becomes
more valuable when the world real interest rate is lower, i.e., the welfare gains
from financial integration are larger.
To show the effects of a decline in the world real interest rate more quan-
titatively, I plot the welfare gains from financial integration for two different
technological growth rates in Figure 3.3. The solid line shows the welfare gains
for each type of financial integration when g is 1.01, while the dashed line shows
the welfare gains when g is 1.02. The figure shows that one percentage point
decrease in the technological growth rate or equivalently about one percentage
decrease in the world real interest rate increases the welfare gains from financial
integration for about one to one and half percent.
3.5.2 Different values of the share of foreign-compatible
workers θ
In this subsection I study how the share of foreign compatible workers is related
to the welfare gains from financial integration. In Figure 3.5, I plot the sequence
of optimal consumption and welfare gains from various financial integration for
four different values for the share of compatible labor: 0.1 to 0.4. The figure
shows that higher share of foreign compatible workers increases the level of
consumption and hence welfare when the economy accepts FDI flows.
73
3.5.3 Different values of the initial level of foreign tech-
nology Af0
In this subsection I study how the initial level of foreign technology is related to
the welfare gains from financial integration. In Figure 3.6, I plot the sequence
of optimal consumption and the welfare gains from various kinds of financial
integration for three different initial levels of foreign technology. The figure
shows that FDI flows bring large welfare gains for countries with lower level of
technology. When the level of foreign technology is 30 percent higher than the
level of domestic technology, welfare gains are more than twice as large as when
the level of foreign technology is 10 percent higher than the level of domestic
technology.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the welfare consequences of liberalizing FDI flows and find
that the gains can be substantial. In the baseline specifications, the liberaliza-
tion increases permanent consumption by four percent, which is a sharp contrast
with debt flows whose liberalization increases permanent consumption only by
half a percent for the same specifications. The results highlight that the overall
welfare gains from financial integration (liberalizing all kinds of foreign capi-
tal flows) can be substantial and the relative importance of FDI flows over debt
flows. This paper conducts a number of sensitivity analysis. In particular, it ex-
amines the implications of a decline in the world real interest rate and a decline
in the labor share of income, the two recent phenomena that have occurred in
many parts of the world. I find that both changes in the economic environment
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increases the welfare gains from financial integration.
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Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.96
γ Risk aversion 2
α Capital share 0.33
δ Depreciation rate 0.06
g Technological growth rate 1.012
θ Fraction of foreign compatible labor 0.2
Ah0 Initial level of domestic technology 1
Af0 Initial level of foreign technology 1.2
Table 3.1: Baseline parameter values
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Figure 3.1: Welfare gains from various forms of financial integration
Note: The figure plots the welfare gains from three forms of financial
integration: open to debt flows (solid line), open to FDI flows (dashed line),
and open to debt and FDI flows (dotted line). The horizontal axis is the initial
level of capital, and the vertical axis is the welfare gains (the unit is
percentage point). I measure the welfare gains by the percentage increase in
consumption at all peirods that equalizes the welfare under financial autarky
and the welfare under financial integration (the Hicksian equivalent variation).
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Figure 3.2: Welfare gains from various forms of financial integration
Note: The figure plots the welfare gains from three forms of financial
integration open to debt flows (solid line), open to FDI flows (dashed line),
and open to debt and FDI flows (dotted line). The horizontal axis is the initial
level of capital, and the vertical axis is the welfare gains (the unit is
percentage point). I measure the welfare gains by the percentage increase in
consumption at all periods that equalizes the welfare under financial autarky
and the welfare under financial integration (the Hicksian equivalent variation).
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Figure 3.3: Welfare gains from various forms of financial integration
Note: The figure plots the welfare gains from three forms of financial
integration: open to debt flows (solid line), open to FDI flows (dashed line),
and open to debt and FDI flows (dotted line). The horizontal axis is the initial
level of capital, and the vertical axis is the welfare gains (the unit is
percentage point). I measure the welfare gains by the percentage increase in
consumption at all peirods that equalizes the welfarae under financial autarky
and the welfare under financial integration (the Hicksian equivalent variation).
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Figure 3.4: Sequence of optimal consumption when Af0 = 1.1 and A
f
0 = 1.2
Note: The figure plots the sequence of optimal consumption when the initial
level of foreign technology is Af0 = 1.1 (blue) and 1.2 (red). The initial level of
capital is set to K0 = 2.5. The other parameter values are listed in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.5: Sequence of optimal consumption and welfare gains from financial
integration for various θ
Note: The figure plots the sequence of optimal consumption and welfare gains
from financial integration when the share of foreign compatible labor varies
from 0.1 to 0.4. The initial level of capital is set to K0 = 2.5. The other
parameter values are listed in Table 3.1.
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Debt and FDI flows
A0
f  = 1.1
1.2
1.3
Figure 3.6: Sequence of optimal consumption and welfare gains from financial
integration for various Af0
Note: The figure plots the sequence of optimal consumption and welfare gains
from financial integration when the initial level of technology varies from 1.1
to 1.3. The initial level of capital is set to K0 = 2.5. The other parameter
values are listed in Table 3.1.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Calculating nominal returns on index-linked gilts In this appendix, I
explain how one computes nominal return on index-linked gilts. Since the yields
of index-linked gilts are quoted in terms of the price level on the issuance date,
we need to take into account of accrued inflation between the gilt’s first issue
date and the date that the investor sells it in order to calculate the nominal re-
turn on the gilt. The adopted price index is called the Retail Price Index (RPI).
The reference RPI is available from UK Debt Management Office’s website.1
In UK, all index-linked gilts issued before 2005 have and an eight-month
indexation lag, and all indexed-gilts issued after 2005 have a three-month in-
dexation lag. Given the three-month indexation lag was introduced recently, I
use an eight-month indexation lag for all the analysis.
I illustrate the calculation of nominal returns by a specific example. Suppose
that 10-year zero coupon index-linked gilts are issued on June 1, 2000. Suppose
also that an investor buys the bond and sells it on July 1, 2000. Then, the
1http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=gilts/indexlinked
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nominal holding period return is calculated as follows:
P ′ − P
P
× RPI for November 1999
RPI for October 1999
where P ′ denotes the price of 9 and 11/12 year index-linked gilt on July 1,
2000 and P denotes the price of 10 year index-linked gilt on June 1, 2000. RPI
denotes the Retail Price Index.
For a day other than the 1st of the month, the reference RPI is calculated
by linearly interpolating the two adjacent reference RPIs. For example, the
reference RPI for August 20, 2005 is calculated as follows:




(Ref RPISeptember 1, 2005 − Ref RPIAugust 1, 2005).
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 The numerical method
In this appendix, I describe the numerical method to compute the optimal
consumption path for the models described in Subsections 2.1 and 2.3.
C.1.1 Financial autarky
Here I describe the method to compute the optimal consumption path for the
case of financial autarky. The object of interest is the policy function (optimal
consumption function) which maps the state variable (capital per efficiency unit
of labor) into the control variable (consumption per efficiency unit of labor):
ct = c(kt). To find the policy function, I first define an equally spaced grid of
the state variable of n points, kn, which includes the steady state value of the
state variable k∗.1 The corresponding policy function thus becomes a vector of
dimension n. I then make an initial guess of the policy function, c1. Then, for
each possible value of the next period’s state variable, kt+1 ∈ kn, I compute
this period’s control variable using the Euler equation and this period’s state
1I set n = 500 in the actual computation.
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variable using the resource constraint:
ct = β
−1/γ (αkα−1t+1 + 1− δ)−1/γ c1(kt+1)g
kt s.t. k
α
t − ct − kt+1g + (1− δ)kt = 0,
which gives us another n combinations of (k, c). I then form the next guess of
the policy function, c2, by interpolating the initial guess and this newly obtained
combinations. I iterate this procedure, until cj and cj+1 become sufficiently close
to each other.
C.1.2 Open to FDI flows
The method to compute the optimal consumption path for the economy which
accepts only FDI flows is essentially the same as the case of financial autarky.
The only difference is that the relevant Euler equation and the resource con-
straint are slightly different:
ct = β
−1/γ (αkα−1t+1 (1− θ)1−α + 1− δ)−1/γ c1(kt+1)g
kt s.t. k
α
t (1− θ)1−α + e− ct − kt+1g + (1− δ)kt = 0,
where e is the home-productivity adjusted labor income for foreign compatible
worker: e ≡ wft θ/Aht .2 The other parts of the method are the same.
2See Subsection 2.3 for the detail about the model.
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C.2 Mathematical Appendix
C.2.1 Derivation of (3.4)








The left-hand side is the present value of lifetime consumption, whereas the
right-hand side is the present value of the lifetime resources. Since the labor
market is competitive, the wage, wt, is equal to the marginal product of labor:
(1− α)A0gtkαt . Since the capital per efficiency unit of labor reaches the steady
state level from period 0 because of financial integration, the wage in time t is
given by
wt = (1− α)(k∗)αA0gt.
Thus, the intertemporal budget constraint (C.1) can be written as
∞∑
t=0











Multiplying both sides of the equation by 1−R∗−1g yields Equation (3.4).
C.2.2 Derivation of (3.5)
I obtain the sequence of optimal consumption when the economy accepts both
debt and FDI flows by combining the results from when the economy accepts
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either debt or FDI flows (but not both). Since both domestic and foreign capital
per efficiency unit of labor jump to its steady state level in time 0 and aggregate
consumption grows at rate g in all periods, I only need to know the initial
level of consumption to obtain the whole sequence of optimal consumption. To
obtain the initial level of consumption, note that the representative household
has three sources of revenue: interests earned from the initial level of capital
R∗K0, labor income from domestic companies (1−θ)wht , and labor income from
foreign companies θwft . The present value of these resources must be equal to
the present value of consumption:
∞∑
t=0

























θAf0 + (1− θ)Ah0
)
.
Multiplying both sides of the equation by 1−R∗−1g gives us Equation (3.5).
C.2.3 The condition under which foreign wage is higher
than domestic wage
In this subsection, I provide the condition under which foreign wage is higher
than domestic wage when the economy is open to only FDI flows. The foreign
wage is given by
wft = (1− α)(k∗)αAft .
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The domestic wage is given by















Since (1− θ)(Af0/Ah0) is typically larger than one, the condition says that if the
initial level of capital per efficiency unit of labor is sufficiently lower than the
steady state level, the foreign wage is higher than the domestic wage.
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